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Here is something puzzling. Still Lifes can be expressive. Expression involves 
movement. Hence, (some) Still Lifes move. This seems odd. I consider a nov-
el explanation to this ‘static-dynamic’ puzzle from Mitchell Green (2007). 
Green defends an analysis of artistic expressivity that is heavily indebted 
to work on intermodal perception. He says visual stimuli, like colours and 
shapes, can elicit experienced resemblances to sounds, smells and feelings. 
This enables viewers to know how an emotion feels by looking at the picture. 
The hypothesis is intriguing, but I show that his suggestion that we empa-
thize with the pictorial content is implausible and that this exposes a flaw in 
the way his argument moves from experiential mappings to experiential-af-
fective mappings. Consequently, I register some reservations about the way 
Green supposes we detect these cross-modal qualities.
STILL MOVING
Vanessa Brassey 
King’s College London
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1 Introduction1
1  I would like to thank all the participants at the BSA Postgraduate conference 2018 
for their feedback on the original paper, the editors of this journal and an anonymous 
referee for detailed and constructive feedback on previous versions of the manuscript.
2  This is one influential formulation of the question of expression favoured by Davies 
(1994) and Budd (2012), but there are others, for instance, Matravers (1998).
3  Still Life paintings are paradigmatically still and therefore static, even though they 
afford ‘experiences of’ that are dynamic. Although a painting may undergo change by 
fading, crumbling, drying or cracking, these changes do not relate to their representa-
tional content, which remains, in some sense, fixed. 
Expressive, emotional or moving qualities are considered a significant 
source of value for Still Life paintings (Budd 2012; Wollheim 1987). One 
lauded feature of Zurbarán’s Still Life with Pottery Jars (c.1635) is its air of 
exuberance, Morandi’s Pots (c.1946) series are praised for their appear-
ance of serenity, and Van Gogh’s Sunflowers (c.1880) for a sense of joyful-
ness. Accounting for this has generated much philosophical discussion 
as theorists seek to explain how inanimate paintings of inanimate 
objects can readily be seen as having emotional (qua psychological) 
properties like exuberance or joy 2 The representation of an emotion in 
a static object, beyond the straightforward depiction of a facial expres-
sion, exercises philosophers since it involves representing something 
dynamic. Emotions may be considered dynamic in several senses of the 
term: (1) physiologically, that is involving a change in a subject’s phys-
iological state and awareness of the same through bodily feeling, (2) 
psychologically, that is involving changes in the way the subject repre-
sents their environment, and (3) temporally, that is involving a subject 
directing their feelings towards the past (e.g. regret, nostalgia) or the 
future (e.g. anticipation, fear) as well as the present (e.g. happiness). In 
addition, emotions are considered dynamic because they come and go 
and because they unfold through a series of initiating, sustaining and 
monitoring phases  For these reasons, emotions are considered to be 
paradigmatically dynamic properties. So how can we see them in static 
pictures?3 How might we explain the odd result that static paintings 
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depicting still objects are correctly experienced as moving?
In this paper, I consider a novel explanation to this ‘static-dynamic’ 
puzzle from Green (2007). Although the theory is intended primarily 
to explain a difference between a bodily emotional expression and 
the expressiveness we predicate of insensate landscapes and artefacts, 
it (1) addresses how static pictures may appear dynamic and (2) has 
the bonus feature of equipping theorists with a generalisable way of 
understanding how single medium artworks offer us rich sensory and 
affective experiences. It potentially offers an exciting new solution to 
the phenomenon of expression considered more broadly. As per Green’s 
hypothesis, Van Gogh’s Still Lifes exploit our proclivity to experience 
a similarity between certain colours (e.g. yellow) and certain affective 
states (e.g. exuberance) while Morandi’s Still Lifes map the physiolog-
ical profile of tranquility or peacefulness to the colour of rosy-pink 
rectangles 4
I proceed as follows. In Section Two, I present Green’s solution in the 
light of the static-dynamic puzzle and in Section Three, I discuss the 
appeal and limitations of his hypothesis. In Section Four, I show that 
the hypothesis, while exciting and novel, has better outcomes in rela-
tion to experiential properties than it has to affective ones. 
4  There have been a number of psychological investigations into the expressive prop-
erties of visual stimuli and Green makes use of several. A broad historical overview is 
provided in Winner (2019, 60-77). 
2 Expressiveness as Showing
The Greenian explanation for the puzzle is extrapolated from his 
broader theory concerning the expressiveness of artworks (incorpo-
rating other media, such as pure music). According to his self-titled 
‘Expressiveness as Showing Theory’ (hereafter est):
est: It is apt to experience P as possessing affective or experi-
ential quality E just in case P is a potential source of knowledge 
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of E—either by showing how E characteristically appears, how 
E characteristically behaves, or how E characteristically feels. 
(Green 2007, 195)
5  Francis Bacon in interview according to Sylvester (1980, 11). 
6  Following James (1884) some theorists prioritize bodily feelings in an account of 
the emotions, for example Prinz (2004). Others advocate that emotions are cognitive 
judgements, for example Solomon (1988). An introduction to the debate is found in Price 
(2015).
I will pay particular attention to est’s third disjunct: showing how E 
feels. This promises to do much of the productive work, by elucidating 
how an observer not only sees that Sunflowers depicts sunflowers, but 
also experiences the pictorial space as being suffused with expressive 
qualities. It is this layering of depicted and affective objects that will 
explain just what ‘brings the figurative thing up on to the nervous sys-
tem more violently and more poignantly’ 5 
In order to understand in what way expressive qualities are dynamic, 
it is useful to be aware of a fundamental distinction in the literature 
between expression and expressiveness. Expressions of emotion are 
manifested by psychological beings.6 Paintings are not psychological 
beings and so are said to be expressive, rather than expressions, of emo-
tions. This distinction can seem confusing at first. A crude but effective 
way to grasp the distinction is to say that in expressiveness only the 
outward characteristics of emotional expressions are manifested. These 
outward characteristics however are sufficient for enabling suitably 
attuned viewers to know how anger appears, behaves or feels. In this 
way, expressive qualities convey ‘what it is like’ to feel anger, while 
not conveying anger (Green 2007, 192). Green follows the literature by 
resisting a conflation between expression and expressiveness. When he 
talks of expressiveness he is not suggesting there is a transmission of an 
actual emotion going on 
With this distinction in place, we can now consider Green’s hypoth-
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esis. Briefly, he holds that static percepts share qualitative features 
with dynamic percepts and it is the mappings between the two that 
account for expressiveness. He begins by citing experiential mappings. 
Green says, citing Marks (1987) ‘intuitively, we think that yellow is more 
like the sound of a piccolo than it is like the sound of an oboe’ (2007, 
179). He observes that a static yellow swatch may elicit an experienced 
resemblance to the dynamic sound of a piccolo. His explanation for 
this is that their qualitative profiles are congruent. What does Green 
mean by ‘qualitative profile’ and ‘congruent’? ‘Qualitative profile’ refers 
to where a percept will be located along three intersecting spectrums 
that respectively run from (i) intense-mild to (ii) pleasant-unpleasant, 
and (iii) dynamic-static (Green 2007, 179) 7 Let’s say yellow is intense, 
pleasant and dynamic. In this case, it will be ‘profiled’ somewhere in the 
light-pleasant-dynamic quadrant of this qualitative three-space. Piccolo 
sounds may have the same profile. In this case it will be ‘congruent’ with 
yellow (Green 2007, 181). One way to visualize this is to think of three-
space as an analogue of Munsell colour space [Fig 1] which represents 
how colours cluster along three spectrums measuring lightness, inten-
sity and chroma 8 One can imagine three-space will be constituted by 
colours, sounds, textures, smells and so on clustering in qualitatively 
similar locations 
7 The hypothesis should survive a change to the three dimensions mentioned. 
8  This example is mine not Green’s.
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Figure 1 Three-dimensional representation of Munsell colourspace (SharkD, 2015)
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So far, we have been told that two experiential states in different sense 
modalities can elicit an experienced resemblance for perceivers in some 
qualitative respect. Next, Green suggests that an affective state, an emo-
tion, will map into this three-space. He uses the following example. In 
the grip of anger, Elizabeth will be given to raising her voice or kicking 
furniture, revealing that ‘anger is intense, slightly unpleasant, and highly 
dynamic ’ (Green 2007, 179) In expressiveness then:
The major triad C–E–G is congruent…with confidence or cheer-
fulness, for both are intense, pleasant, and relatively static. The 
color yellow is congruent with exuberance, for both are intense, 
pleasant, and dynamic  (Green 2007, 183)
In this way, Zurbarán’s paintings gain their expressiveness by exploiting 
a qualitative congruency between the colours, shapes and sensations. 
Green says that in order to elicit the experienced resemblance the 
viewer must empathize with the expressive (congruent) content. It is 
supposed that this mode of attention allows the viewer to appropriately 
entertain the intersubjective and functionally tractable aspects of the 
way joyful excitement feels (Green 2007, 188).
In summary, Green holds that an emotion such as anger has a qual-
itative profile that can be plotted in ‘three-space’. This profile can be 
expressed cross-modally (that is, the same profile can be expressed 
visually by a colour or shape, or audibly by a sound). In this way, a paint-
ing instantiating the colours or shapes that map to anger’s qualitative 
profile will appear to be expressive of anger. 
3 Discussion
3.1 Biological or Conventional Congruency?
At this point it would be reasonable to ask if the idea of qualitative 
‘three-space’ is a prima facie plausible concept. Why believe that while 
42 Vanessa Brassey 
the senses differ in respect to information processing and in how they 
present the world around us, there are important and fixed neural com-
municative channels between them?9 
Green could block this skeptical worry by citing evidence for the per-
vasive inter-modality of neural processing and sensory equivalence. 
According to empirical psychologists the tendency to name a spiky 
shape “kiki” and a roundish shape “bouba”, indicates that our brains sys-
tematically connect sounds, spatial movement and shapes at a sub-per-
sonal level (Milan et al  2013)  Green’s view is that these type of connec-
tions are not merely conventional, but that there is something universal 
or deep-wired at play here.10 But, one may ask, would a weaker associa-
tion be problematic for est? The tendency we display in our colloquial 
discourse to link upwards scaling sounds, with upward movements and 
dark to light colour hues is not obviously fixed biologically. At least, it is 
easy to imagine a culture in which the association was reversed. 
I think est can survive the weaker associative explanation. Given the 
pervasiveness of empirically noted congruencies, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that normal intermodal associations, however they develop 
and despite the absences of any biological imperative, will, once neu-
rally fixed, apply comprehensively. Even though conventional associa-
tion is weaker than a biological congruence, it is enough to ensure that 
intersubjective attitudes flourish. If associating percepts, say S1 with S2, 
9  Simner et al. (2005) holds that within any population, standard biases exist in the as-
sociations of letters with colours. While grapheme–colour synaesthetes were significantly 
more consistent over time in their choice of colours, Simner’s studies identified notable 
levels of inter-subject agreement across general populations. From this, he concludes 
that grapheme–colour synaesthesia, whilst only exhibited by certain individuals, stems 
in part from mechanisms that are common to us all. Meanwhile Matthen (2015) endorses 
the view that the senses, while different from one another in terms of information pro-
cessing, share communicative channels. He notes that speech and flavour in particular 
are constituted multi-modally. The substitution of one modality in place of another, for 
instance demonstrating an agent’s ability to retrieve visual information from specially 
arranged tactile stimulation, suggests that we can, in some sense, ‘see’ haptically. 
10  Green cites Marks (1987).
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can become neurally fixed, there is no more reason to deny the efficacy 
of congruency than there is to deny the efficacy of money or names. 
This means that a Still Life which exploits neurally fixed associations 
could elicit a phenomenological mapping of a static percept to dynamic 
percept  
3.2 Fine-grainedness
We are now ready to consider a further criticism from Moore (2010) 
who puts pressure on Green’s theory at the following point. How similar 
do S1 and S2 have to be to count as instantiating the same place on the 
grid? For example, what is the minimum level of fine-grainedness that 
is sufficient for eliciting an experienced resemblance between ‘yellow’ 
and ‘exuberant’? Set the level too wide and the static percept can be 
mapped to every location on the grid (every perceptual experience will 
have some qualitative profile). Set it too narrowly and a percept will 
only map to itself. 
Green would reply, I suspect, that fine-grainedness can be satisfied by 
ensuring that the terms ‘intense’ and ‘dynamic’ pick out the same thing 
when said of experiences of yellow, trilling piccolos and exuberance. 
This is an empirical question, not a philosophical one and the philos-
opher need only acknowledge that qualifying the lexical semantics is 
important, because est needs it to be the case that words like ‘dynamic’ 
mean roughly the same in all domains – ‘colour’, ‘sounds’ and ‘intro-
specting states’. But it does not require the philosopher provide evidence 
that they do. A Still Life that is made up of percepts that are in the 
vicinity of intense-pleasant-dynamic qualitative space will elicit expe-
riences that are more like joy than they are like sadness. This explains 
why my experience of Sunflowers in which I see warm yellows, a pat-
terned texture, round, fleshy forms and dashes of sap green incline me 
to say the picture is joyful or uplifting or positively charged. It does not 
require me to provide a fine-grained description of joy, a joyous episode 
or arouse in me specific feelings of joyousness in order for the experi-
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enced resemblance to manifest. This response, should Green choose 
to exploit it, would also enable him to offer an explanation as to why 
specific works (that is, works in a specific material mode) are not easily 
replaced by works in an alternative mode. Since the translation across 
genres is inexact, an expressive aural work is not replaceable by a visual 
work without loss. Two such works that both expressed ‘joy’ or ‘anxiety’ 
would offer similar but non-duplicating experiences.11 
11  I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
3.3. Psycho-Physical Considerations
Here is a second worry from Moore. Even if the link between S1 and S2 
is relatively settled inter-subjectively and beyond simple convention 
in some qualitative respect, is this all we need to explain the link? Why 
deny psycho-physical facts about the external environment, psycholog-
ical salience or physiological subtleties will impact on the conceptual 
linkage between sensation and emotion? (Moore 2010, 97) One may ask: 
is congruency sufficient for temporally static objects to be experienced 
as instantiating dynamic qualities? 
est endorses sufficiency. Recall, est says it is apt to experience the 
painting as exuberant when ‘it shows us…how E characteristically feels.’ 
(Green 2007, 195) One can simply look and see that yellow and orange 
rectangles arranged just so are exuberant (Green 2007, 41) 
This inspires me to formulate a further criticism of the view. Let’s say we 
grant Green’s claim that yellow has default associations and that these 
are neurally fixed. Should we not then expect there to be some insist-
ent experience or visualization of sweetness, light joy or the trilling of 
piccolos (or whatever maps to the yellowy palette)? If so, this expecta-
tion is not met by our actual experiences  Despite spending many hours 
enjoying paintings I struggle to remember an experience of them that 
was noticeably noisy or tasty. Whatever dynamic properties I may be 
aware of when attending to Sunflowers, an experience of flutes or vanilla 
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does not appear to me to be among them  Yet, Green appears to cite an 
insistent intermodal mapping between yellow-colour: piccolo-sound: 
vanilla-taste: joy-affect. For this reason, one might ask why the painting 
of the Sunflowers is taken to represent joy but not the taste of vanilla? 
Can any putative neurally fixed association be overridden or muted? 
This question is distinct from questions about whether the mapping 
display plasticity 12 For example, that at time ‘t’ yellow maps to a par-
ticular taste (lemons), sound (flutes) and mood (joy) for S, but at time 
‘t+1’ yellow maps to vanilla, the harp and serenity for S. The question 
concerns the more local, specific issue of why this colour maps to affect 
when experienced here and now in this picture  What determines the 
corresponding sensational partner cued by a particular visual stimulus? 
One thought is that there is a further pictorial cue that constrains the 
mapping between select senses, but which has been overlooked in this 
account  
Green could reply that there is nothing overlooked  Visual stimuli 
merely have a propensity to trigger these experiences, but no automatic 
or insistent trigger for them. He may suggest that general consensus 
concerning the expressivity of an isolated shape, phenome or colour 
swatch is made more determinate by further cues in the work – for 
instance, the depictive content. There is a suspicion however that since 
these further cues can determine whether or not a percept ‘fires’ or ‘trig-
gers’ the mapping, they are more fundamental (or prior) to the expres-
sivity  
Green seems to disagree. He thinks that the sensational mappings act 
‘as a kind of prop on the basis of which to imagine’ feeling the appro-
priate emotion (Green 2007, 190)  From this, I take it that he intends 
the mappings to be basic and to enable a further imaginative enterprise 
that allows the viewer to represent the dynamic emotional qualities. But 
it is not clear why these mappings should precede the viewer imagining 
12  Perceptual plasticity is discussed in Bayne (2015).
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the emotional qualities. According to standard models of imagining 
oneself to feel into or along with emotionally resonant objects, things 
work in the reverse order to the one Green offers us.13 This makes it 
unclear why some mappings are represented by the viewer and others 
are muted in the representation. Since the viewer’s imaginative enter-
prise is informed by the actual mapping (the mapping is the cue to 
imagine thus), what is the precedent cue that determines the viewer 
should execute ‘this mapping’ from the potential set ‘all these mappings’ 
in Green’s schema? This follows from the earlier comment that if there 
are no automatic insistent mappings that take place, there is a further 
respect in which a specific mapping remains unexplained. As things 
stand, congruency may partly describe how Still Lifes come to have 
dynamic qualities, but not why this particular emotion was realised. 
Consider, for instance, how Freud’s Girl with White Dog (c 1951) also uses 
a yellow palette but is experienced as anxious not joyful. The picture is 
tense, sad and still. The explanation of this is not going to be satisfied by 
what Green has told us. The worry is that est at best identifies a series 
of specific compositional elements that have led us from static object 
to dynamic experience, but that this does not give us an account of the 
kind of causal connections that account for why we experienced the 
painting in this way, to the exclusion of other possible associations and 
experiences. Why for instance, do I not experience Chardin’s paintings 
as tasting of vanilla, as smelling of rotting fish or as cacophonous? Why 
is there the connection between this static percept and this feeling? 
Green could respond by explaining how yellow is experienced as both 
joyful and anxious in the two paintings by pointing out that colours 
appear different when embedded in different contexts. A viewer’s expe-
rience of a colour is sensitive to the colours around it and to the type 
of light source shining on it. For example, in simultaneous contrast, a 
single pigment, placed inside different surrounding colours, holding all 
13  See Coplan (2011).
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other conditions steady, looks different to us and in metamerism col-
ours ‘change’ when light sources change (between led and natural day-
light). For this reason, a palette of yellow, orange-yellow and sap green 
will convey sweetness in one picture, while a palette of yellow-grey and 
purple-grey will convey sourness in another. 
3.4 From Experiential to Affective States
I think this throws up a more serious problem for the Greenian. The 
static-dynamic relation, if it holds at all, is most obviously held here 
between two experiential states, that is, states associated with our 
senses. Green needs it to be the case that ‘yellowy-orange’ is congruent 
with a sub-species of affective states – that is, emotions. These are states 
that are about something or experienced toward objects. So, Sunflowers, 
if expressive of emotion-like states, may be said to express anticipation 
(e.g. ‘Gaugin is on his way to Arles!’), hope (e.g. ‘will he like the paint-
ings?’), or delight (e.g. ‘he appreciates the work!’). These states are much 
more cognitively rich than intensity, pleasantness and so on. How then 
will est explain the way we are able to move from congruent experien-
tial states to congruent experiential-emotion states? 
Green’s answer seems, at first, ingenious. He says the congruency 
between (static) experiential percepts and (dynamic) affective states 
is realised by the viewer empathetically attending to the qualitative 
profile of the perceptual material (2007, 187-192). The viewer elicits an 
experienced resemblance between static perceptual information and 
dynamic affective states, just as the viewer may experience the map-
pings between two experiential states by empathising with the qualita-
tive properties 
However, once we start to reflect on the claim that viewers empathise 
with congruent properties, we see that it is odd. For one thing, emo-
tional qualities are not reducible to their physiological profiles without 
remainder. An emotion mapped in three-space would appear to lack 
‘aboutness’, or what the feeling aims at, that identifies the state. For this 
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reason, it is not clear what identifies an emotion from a cluster of possi-
ble emotions that share similar physiological traits. How would I be able 
to distinguish anger from fear using three-space properties? It seems we 
need some intentional content to get the empathy going  Green argues 
that the retrieval of dynamic qualities from the static stimulant is part 
of a cognitive process, in which the viewer comes to know something 
about E by simulating the appropriate mental states (2007, 187-192). He 
must think then, that the static-dynamic congruency enables a sharing 
of emotional states with some degree of accuracy and where the viewer 
can come to know how some E feels. But what would satisfy ‘some 
degree of accuracy’ here?
In addition, it is not clear why empathising is appropriate, or even 
possible, if levelled against three-space. How does Green make sense 
of the idea that viewers undergo an experienced resemblance between 
the perceptible properties of paintings and the feeling of an emotion 
by ‘empathising’ with their three-space qualities? According to Green, 
a necessary condition on empathy is that it is directed at and involves 
concern for ‘another’ and involves imagining one’s way into another’s 
situation. It therefore involves an observer (e.g. Bonnard), and a target, 
(e g  Van Gogh)  Green, it seems, thinks that in experiencing Sunflow-
ers, Bonnard will ‘call into consciousness [his] experience of ϕ feeling 
without actually reliving ϕ’ (2007, 190). Bonnard in some sense ‘reads’ 
the painting, using the yellow and the thick impasto textures to call up 
the emotion ‘joy’, a property of subjects like Van Gogh. But per est, Bon-
nard’s target is three-space and not Van Gogh’s mental state. The ques-
tion can then be asked in this way - is empathy the correct way to make 
sense of Bonnard’s experience if we accept congruency? It seems inco-
herent to say Bonnard empathises his way into three-space (Green 2007, 
190)  While there is nothing particularly implausible about the percep-
tion of an intermodal congruency, nor anything implausible about the 
suggestion that we empathise with pictorial content, there is something 
odd about the way Green is fitting these two together. That is, he is not 
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fitting them together plausibly. Three-space is a theoretical construct, 
whereas empathy aims at sentient emoting beings. By his own lights, 
Green fails to illuminate why empathising will harness the congruency 
in three-space in the same way our gateway senses supposedly give us 
experienced resemblances cross-modally  
While I’m aware that empathy is a slippery concept that can be shoe-
horned into something that either fights Green or helps him out, I 
struggle to see how Green can respond satisfactorily to this incompat-
ibility. Rather than give up on the idea that there is a seamless congru-
ent relation between affective and experiential states in three-space, 
he can attempt to the resolve the tension by getting the description 
of empathy to work. Green’s account of empathy aligns with the com-
monly held view that we imagine our way into the emotional states of 
other persons, not conceptual constructs. For this reason, it will require 
significant reconstruction to cohere with congruency. One suggestion is 
that he simply insists viewers engage in incoherent experiences when 
eliciting resemblances. Just why the viewer is not aware of the incoher-
ence, misuse of empathy or lack of imaginative targets would have to 
be spelled out elsewhere. Alternatively, he might say that, qua expres-
siveness, Still Lifes convey moods not emotions. They may be anxious 
but they are not sad, exuberant but not excited  As a result, empathy is 
not warranted and something softer – a form of contagion will elicit the 
appropriate dynamic ‘feel’. What Green cannot do is defend the disjunc-
tive claim ‘est’ using the current explanation  
4 Conclusion
Green offers an exciting hypothesis about expressiveness which was 
used to elucidate the static-dynamic puzzle for Still Lifes. An initial 
discussion exposed a problem with his articulation of the relationship 
between qualitative properties and empathy. Consequently, the puzzle 
of expressiveness remains unsolved.
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